This paper positions itself among the very rare microeconomic analyses on the consequences of civil war. Up to now, most analyses on this topic are based upon household surveys. The originality of the present study is that it investigates for the first time the likely predominant route by which civil conflict affects the economy, namely through firms. The context of the study is Sierra Leone, a country that was ravaged by a violent conflict from 1991 to 2002. The approach is to use geographical variations in the intensity of conflict to estimate the impact of violence on firms, on which we have data from the World Bank 2007 Employers Survey. The proposed theory is that during the conflict, violence affects production through a form of technical regress and demand through a reduction in income. The persistent post-conflict effects are yet less obvious…/
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We assume that war forces a prolonged contraction in output skills, which slows the pace of recovery. We termed this phenomenon 'forgetting by not doing'. The results confirm our theory. Civil war negatively impacts the existence of firms and employment, but there is no distinction between regions. However, the size of firms in 2006 is negatively affected by the intensity of the war in the area it operates. Yet, firms tend to grow twice faster in more affected areas, strikingly matching the macroeconomic rate of recovery post-conflict environments (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) . The analysis of training patterns clearly confirms the long lasting lack of skills experienced as a result of the war in areas where the conflict was more intense.
Introduction
Civil war is a difficult context for applied economic research. To date, the economic consequences of civil war and its aftermath have been investigated predominantly at the macroeconomic level, using national accounts data to estimate the impact on GDP (Barro, 1991; Collier, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004 ). The relatively rare microeconomic analyses have been based upon household survey data, focusing upon the vulnerability to violence (Deininger, 2003) and the effect of being a victim of violence upon subsequent political participation (Bellows and Miguel, 2007 ). Yet, the predominant route by which civil war affects the economy is likely to be through firms. To our knowledge, the present study is the first to use firm level data to investigate the effects of civil war and post-conflict recovery. The added value of such an analysis lies in the microeconomic evidence. We fully acknowledge that the poor quality of the dataset calls for further investigation to allow robust conclusions.
The context of the research is Sierra Leone. Between 1991 and 2002 Sierra Leone was ravaged by an extremely violent civil war. The war led to over 50,000 deaths, the displacement of 500,000 civilians, and a wholesale destruction of the national economy. By the end of the war, Sierra Leone had sunk to the bottom of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index
(HDI). In 2002, peace was achieved by the intervention of British troops: the insurgent Revolutionary
United Front rapidly collapsed. Since then security has been maintained without significant challenge, aided by a continued British military presence. Yet, the pace of recovery has been modest: in 2008, the most recent year for which data is available, the country remained at the bottom of the HDI.
While the conflict in Sierra Leone was intense and prolonged, it was concentrated in particular locations. Household data analysed by Bellows and Miguel (2007) provides a reasonable measure of this spatial variation. Our approach is to use this variation to estimate the impact of violence on the growth of firms, on which we have data from a firm survey. Clearly, even firms in areas not directly affected by violence were nevertheless operating in a country at civil war and this is likely to have affected their performance. During war time government policies will deteriorate, trade with conflict-affected areas will be reduced, and firms may fear that violence will spread to their own area. Hence, our approach is likely to underestimate the full effects of civil war and so should be thought of as a lower bound.
How might exposure to the violence of civil war affect firms? In Section 2 we propose a simple theory. The effects during war are straightforward: violence affects production through a form of technical regress and demand through a reduction in income. However, the persistent post-conflict effects are less obvious: we propose a phenomenon that we term 'forgetting by not doing'. In essence,
war forces a prolonged contraction in output, skills atrophy through neglect and this slows the pace of recovery. In Section 3 we describe the context of the war in Sierra Leone, and in Section 4 our data.
Section 5 presents our results.
The Effect of civil war on firm performance
The most striking visual images of violence are those of physical destruction. These effects are potentially persistent even after the conflict has ended. However, in low income countries they may be relatively minor: there is little capital at risk and after the conflict replacements can swiftly be imported. Miguel and Roland (2006) study the effects of the bombing of Vietnam, probably the most destructive civil war in any developing country and clearly far more destructive than that in Sierra Leone. They find that the bombing left no discernable long term economic effects. Cerra and Saxena (2008) observe that output partially rebounds after a civil war, in contrast to financial crises. Using a panel data they found that half the loss is recuperated after four years, while the other half of cumulative loss remains after a decade. They explain this characteristic rebound by the fact that rebuilt infrastructures can be repaired within a short time. However, they do not formulate any hypothesis about the causes of the persistent loss. Rather than physical destruction, the most important effects of civil war violence on firms are likely to have been the disruption of production through the flight of employees, the unreliability of transport, and the fear of looting. Faced with unreliable transport, firms would normally have carried larger inventories, but the fear of looting would warrant the opposite response. Such costs of disruption can be characterized as technical regress in the formal, private sector of the economy and so raise the unit cost of its output.
Firms are also affected by a decline in demand. This is driven by the decline in incomes, and more particularly cash incomes, as people move liquid assets abroad for safety and shift into subsistence activities. The demand for the output of the formal private sector is thus reduced through a combination of the higher unit cost of its output and the reduced cash income of the wider economy.
These effects in themselves appear to be readily reversible, so that post-conflict recovery should be rapid. With a secure peace productivity, the demand would be restored. Why might the cost of conflict be more persistent? We propose that in low income countries such as Sierra Leone the key channel for persistence is not physical, but human capital, and that the key route by which human capital is lost is through the atrophy of skills.
Skills are maintained through use. The theory of 'learning by doing' (Arrow, 1962) proposed that 'doing' was the main mechanism for learning, but more evidently it is essential to the retention of task-specific knowledge. The technical regress induced by civil war reduces the maintenance of skills through two effects. Directly, technical regress amounts to the reversion to production practices, which in normal times would be inefficient. For example, if there is no electricity, workers may need to switch to manual operations. In effect, they learn reversionary techniques which peace will make redundant, and forget techniques which peace will again make feasible and superior. Indirectly, technical regress reduces the maintenance of skills through its aggregate effect on income and hence on demand. Indirectly, the contraction of output in response to the decline in demand leads to a contraction in the labour force, though less than proportionately due to the productivity decline. The decline in employment then deskills that part of the labour force that loses employment in the activity, in a process analogous to the deskilling of workers who remain unemployed for long periods, although this literature has essentially been studied in developed economies. Pissarides (1992) uses a stylized model to emphasize that the loss of skills associated with unemployment persistence can have long lasting consequences and may explain the observed slow adjustment of the labour market after a temporary shock on employment. This easily relates to our theory that the most persistent consequence of war is the destruction of human capital. The 'effect of the business cycle' (Dynarski and Sheffrin, 1990; Baker, 1992) translates into an increase of unemployment length during economic recession. Indeed, the outflow rate for long term unemployment collapses during recession as employers have larger pools of labour to choose from. Of course, in developed countries, wages would adjust and unions would play a major role. In Europe, Machin and Manning (1999) conclude that higher rates of long term unemployment put an upwards pressure on wages that tend to be higher in periods of large unemployment.
Although the phenomenon is similar to the deskilling of unemployed workers, the recovery mechanisms are likely to be different in the case of post-conflict as most workers are employed in the informal sector.
The atrophy of skills through reversionary technology and reduced employment is only of consequence once peace is restored. Having adjusted to the conditions of conflict, with the onset of peace firms find themselves in a favourable disequilibrium. Demand increases and there is now scope to abandon the reversionary technologies. In response to the disequilibrium firms expand, but in doing so they encounter a shortage of skilled labour. Firms in conflict-affected areas must therefore make do with lower quality workers and hence have lower productivity.
This simple theory of the effect of conflict and its legacy on firms has testable implications. The most evident is that during conflict those firms in areas most affected by conflict would contract relative to those in less affected areas. Similarly, in post-conflict, we would expect this pattern to be reversed. A less evident testable implication is that, in the post-conflict phase, there would be an apparent paradox: the fastest growing firms would be less productive. Finally, in the post-conflict phase, those firms in conflict-affected areas would manifest the most severe shortage of skilled labour.
Taking a Cobb-Douglas production function where Y the production level at date t depends on the level of K, the stock of capital at time t, L the stock of labour, and A the stock of knowledge. Arrows (1962) defines the learning by doing effect as:
with B > 0 ; φ > 0 and K t = sY t where s is the saving rate.
This, however, does not enable us to capture the impact on the stock of knowledge A of a decrease in production from the previous periods which leads to the resurrection of reversionary technologies, and so a loss of skill in cutting-edge technologies. One way to model such an effect would be to introduce the concept of previous peak output, and allow A to decline in responses to shortfalls of current output from previous peak output. Thus, to capture this effect of forgetting by not doing we rewrite (1):
where δ Y t = 1 if Y t < 0 and 0 otherwise and C < 0. In other words when Y t > 0, we observe the standard 'learning by doing' effect, but when Y t < 0, which is characteristic of conflict environment, the 'learning by doing' effect is replaced by a 'forgetting by not doing' effect. As production shrinks during the war when activity reverts to subsistence, the level of knowledge of the economy A, decreases from its previous level.
This paper is an attempt to test the veracity of our 'forgetting by not doing' theory using country level data on Sierra Leone. Without a doubt, the main contribution to the existing literature therefore stands at the micro level. The idea is to investigate whether firms in zones highly affected by the war behave differently five years after the end of the conflict. In particular, do those firms face higher shortages in human capital and as a result a higher demand for skills? This would confirm that firms in conflict-affected areas have to make do with lower quality workers and consequently, that the persistent effect of war on firms is through human capital. In order for us to fully validate our theory, we need to make sure that our analysis does not capture a completely different story. Indeed, a higher demand for human capital could serve as a substitute for physical investment. Machines, for example, might be too expensive to import and, as a consequence, employers would invest into human capital to compensate the lack of machines. Even workers who previously worked on machines might need to be trained to work manually. If this constitutes reality there is a danger in interpreting investment in human capital as validating the 'forgetting by not doing' while in fact the effects of war are on physical capital.
To avoid misinterpretation we need to discuss the physical capital-labour complementarity versus substitutability. However, as is always the case in analyses focusing on post-conflict environments, we face problems with the quality of the data. One of the main limitations is that we have very little information on firms prior to the shock. In particular we have no information on the capital/labour intensity by sectors prior to the war. We also cannot estimate a production function with precision political stability as a result of the predominant role played by youth during the civil war. rather small number of large firms operating in the country. Moreover, existing businesses face massive constraints on growth and expansion such as access to finance, due to a completely underdeveloped formal credit system, poor access to electricity, 5 and an apparent lack of resources (World Bank, 2007).
The 2007 World Bank study also reports that availability of labour does not constitute a constraint in itself for firms but the availability of skilled workers remains a major problem for the largest ones. face among the worst conditions in dealing with construction permits, but also in employing workers, registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and in closing a business. In more details, the study reports a duration of 283 days to build a warehouse.
Firing costs amount to 189 weeks of salary as opposed to an average of 68.3 weeks in the region. On the credit side, the scope, access, and quality of credit information available through public registries or private bureaus is close to nil. The costs of enforcing contracts in percentage of claims are three times higher than in the region. Overall, this difficult operating environment explains in part the slow growing path of the private sector. In the context of this paper, it is necessary to highlight some of the particular features of the war.
The war erupted in 1991 at the border with neighbouring Liberia and later on spread out over the entire country, reaching Freetown on Jan 6 1999. The war techniques included, among others, the systematic targeting of civilians as a terror tactic, rapes, cutting of limbs, abduction of child soldiers as well as the intensive looting of diamond resources located essentially in the areas bordering Liberia.
The decade of fighting was rythmed by advancements of the rebels towards Freetown and defeats against the government army, and later on by ECOWAS peacekeepers pushing them back towards their stronghold in the East. The fighting was not dictated by the destruction of particular economic sectors, apart from mining. In other words, the variation in conflict intensity was not systematically related to the structure of the economy. On the contrary, the primary incentive was to control Freetown and as the rebel forces advanced towards their objective whatever was on the way -villages, villagers, towns -was destroyed. The war tactics were characterized by extensive looting of anything with any value such as during Operation Pay Yourself and by widespread killings of civilians as an effective terror tactic such as Operation Burn House. The deadliest illustration of the later was with no doubt
Operation No Living Thing, the name speaks for itself.
Data
The Sierra Leone Employers Survey country has been affected by the civil war in the 1990s. For our study, which focuses on firms, we only relied on the urban area data that surveyed 419 formal and 248 informal businesses. 7 All 30 large and 136 medium-sized firms were surveyed along with 502 small businesses.
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It is important to acknowledge a possible selection bias. Indeed, only survivor firms were surveyed and it is impossible to methodologically assess the reasons why those firms survived and others did not.
This potential bias might affect the results and data is insufficient to enable correction. However, a few studies have investigated the survival of firms in Africa, and especially in Ghana, a country similar to Sierra Leone in many ways (geography, language, colonial history) with the exception that it never experienced civil war (Söderbom et al., 2005; Frazer, 2005; Söderbom and Teal, 2006) . Both investigations conclude for a significant relationship between productivity and probability of exit. Nevertheless, while they also both find a size effect -that smaller firms have a higher probability of disappearing -Harding et al.'s (2006) results using data on Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania suggest that 'creative destruction' occurs among large firms but not small firms. Is it likely that the same happened in Sierra Leone during the war? Probably. But the rate of destruction was certainly much higher, especially in war zones. So if survival rate followed the same path in Sierra Leone, small firms would have been destroyed together with less productive large firms. In fact, the productive large firms might have closed down to reopen after the war. As a result, the number of small firms is potentially lower in highly intense conflict areas. Large firms might be on average more productive than what they would have been and finally, a large proportion of small firms might have disappeared. The latter point may well have been offset at the end of the war with small business creation. The potential impact of the selection bias on each dependent variable at the firm level will be discussed in due course.
We use the number of firms per chiefdom to control for the state of the economy before the war. The intensity of war, our variable of interest for this analysis, is calculated following Bellows and Miguel (2006) . We compile the average answer by chiefdom to four questions asked to households:
-Were any members of your household killed during the war?
-Were any members of your household injured/maimed during the war?
-Did anyone from this community/neighbourhood die as the result of the conflict?
-Were any members of this community/neighbourhood injured/maimed as a result of the conflict?
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We are then left with four variables by chiefdoms ranging from 0 to 1. 10 We define the intensity of conflict as the mean of these four variables. It is important to mention that almost 80 per cent of the households surveyed moved to their community before 2002, we thus expect that our intensity variable represents the reality and is not based on population movements. Bellows and Miguel (2006) used information on whether any members of the responding household were made refugees during the war instead of the information focusing on the wider community level. We use their slightly different measure of conflict intensity to check the robustness of our results.
A problem of endogeneity may arise from the fact that higher intensity areas might have had intrinsic characteristics making them more likely to be affected by hostilities. This could lead to biased estimators in our regressions. To avoid such a possibility we instrument the intensity of conflict using the distance to Monrovia from the epicentre of the chiefdom in kilometres. The assumption is that the closer to Liberia, the more intense the conflict in the chiefdom. 10 Refer to the maps in the appendix to visualize the differences in the intensity of conflict at the district and chiefdom level.
11 As a matter of fact, it is now widely believed that the civil war in Sierra Leone was, to a great extent, orchestrated by the neighbouring Liberia. Indeed, subsequent parts of the rebel factions operating at the start of the war in 1991 appeared to have been constituted of Liberian citizens. Furthermore diamonds mined in Sierra Leone were smuggled by the rebels through the border (Smillie et al., 2000) probably in exchange for arms and ammunitions. None of these facts however have been proved so far and former President Charles Taylor's ongoing trial at the Special Court for Sierra Leone should answer some questions regarding the RUF's Liberian linkages. Charles Taylor's trial began in 2006. He is tried for his implication in the war in Sierra Leone and charged with 11 counts of Crimes against humanity and War crimes). require the use of high clearance vehicles. It takes approximately eight hours to travel from Kenema, the largest town close to the border on Sierra Leone's side, to the border gate at Bo-Waterside. The last 50 kilometres are gravel roads. The heavy precipitation around the border further increases travelling difficulties in the area, especially during the rainy season (May to December). In addition, the main border bridge to cross the Mano River was closed from 1990 due to war in both countries. It only reopened in June 2007, after the data was collected. Distance to Monrovia, as a tradable route, is therefore unlikely to have played a role in the recovery of the surveyed firms. Statistically, distance to Monrovia is not significant when introduced in most of the core OLS regressions. First stage regressions confirm that the distance to Monrovia is a strong predictor of the intensity of conflict. It is highly statistically significant at a one per cent threshold in all regressions.
Results
We first investigate the legacy of the conflict at the chiefdom level. We then dig further in analysing the impact on the firms themselves to verify our hypothesis that civil war durably affects human capital.
At the chiefdom level: the effect of the war on the existence of firms and employment
We start the analysis by focusing on the information available at the chiefdom level. Firstly we investigate whether the intensity of the conflict had a significant impact on the number of firms now operating per chiefdom and per sector and estimate the following equation:
where i refers to the chiefdom and j to the sector. X is a set of control characteristics at the chiefdom level that includes the number of firms by sector and chiefdom in 1970. Sector j is a discrete variable taking the value of 1 for the sector j. Intensity i is the conflict intensity level of chiefdom i.
The interacted terms intensity i x sector j capture a potential sectorial legacy of war.
Interestingly, there is no significant relationship between the number of firms in 2006 and the intensity of war at the chiefdom level. In addition, the interacted term between intensity of conflict and the number of firms per sector in the chiefdom is only significant at 10 percent with instrumentation, suggesting that the economy was affected as a whole, uniformily.
12 The district-fixed effects enable comparison inside a smaller geographical identity where it is thought that other external factors that could affect our dependent variables, such as climate, are rather similar. None of the sector dummies 12 Note that certain sectors were inexistent in 1970, preventing us to investigate the ratio of the number of firms in 2006 over the number of firms in 1970.
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or any of the interacted terms between the intensity variable and the sector dummies are significant.
Overall the results suggest that the intensity of war did not affect the current (2006) existence of firms.
Either conflict led to a uniform destruction of the economy of the whole country, or firms were rapidly reestablished following the end of the conflict. There is no identifiable sector effect of the war. The results are presented in Table 1 . Notes: * significant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. Agroactivities refer to main activity reported as fishing, forestry, poultry, livestock, and agrobusiness; manufacturing corresponds to manufacturing activities, mining and quarrying as well as electricity, gas and water; sale corresponds to retail and wholesale activities; services refer to main activity reported as repairs, hotels and restaurants, transport, communication, real estate, public administration, financial estate, and others including legal activities, etc.; the health and education sector definition regroups pharmacy, education, health, and social work activities.
and estimate the following equation, similar to equation (3):
where, i designates the chiefdom and j the sector. X is a set of controls for chiefdom i and sector j is a discrete variable equal to 1 for the sector j. The interacted terms capture a potential different effect of the war on employment level depending on the sector considered. We can indeed envisage that some sectors of activities were more affected by the war then others.
The results are reported in Table 2 . The conclusion is alike. The intensity of the war does not significantly affect current (2006) employment at the chiefdom level. Again, either Sierra Leone's labour market was affected as a whole with no apparent difference between areas where the conflict was more or less intense, or employment rapidly recovered. 
At the firm level: effects on size, income, and needs of the firms
To investigate deeper the impact of the conflict we now use the firm level dataset. 14 We first look into the possibility that the intensity of conflict had an impact on the size of existing firms 15 while estimating:
where k refers to the firm k, i to the chiefdom i, X i are characteristics of the chiefdom i and X k of the firm k. conf licthistory k is a set of variables capturing the history of the firm k relative to the conflict and value of 1 for the sector j. Intensity i is the conflict intensity level of chiefdom i.
We now find significant effects of the intensity of conflict. As is common, we find that the older the firm, the larger the number of employees. From the age of the firm we enter the number of years during which the firm was exposed to the conflict. Interacting this with the intensity of conflict in the area in which the firm operates, the coefficient is significant and negative with an absolute value about twice that of the direct effect of the number of years during the conflict that the firm was operating.
Thus, firms operating in chiefdoms that had more intense fighting are now (2006) significantly smaller than other firms ceteris paribus. A possible explanation could be that they faced a shortage of labour during the conflict as workers moved into the armed forces or were displaced. This leads to a drop in terms of inputs available in a labour-intensive economy as well as a fall in demand. Note that the selection bias implies that survivor firms should be bigger where the conflict was more intense, thus potentially leading to an underestimation of the coefficient of the interactive term.
Whereas employment evidently declined as a result of the intensity of violence during the conflict, it then recovered correspondingly faster post-conflict. The coefficient on the number of years since the conflict, interacted with the intensity level of the war, is positive and significant. Recalling that the intensity measure varies on a 0 to 1 scale, the more intense the conflict was, the faster the economy recovered.
However, the rate of recovery is only half the rate of decay during the conflict. This difference is robust to instrumentation and to the inclusion of district dummies. As it happens, this ratio matches the one found in macroeconomic data on the rate of contraction during civil war and recovery post-conflict estimated by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) : a country that faced an average seven years long civil war will need 14 years to reach its counterfactual GDP. In other words, it appears to take approximately twice the length of the war for both the whole national economy and for employment in a firm to recover.
14 When studying the firms in 2006, it is important to acknowledge that the sample is de facto only constituted of firms that survived the war or were born after it. 15 We use the number of employees as a proxy of the size of the firm. Note: * significant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%.
Studying the impact of conflict on the income of the firms requires the use of an ordered probit:
employers were asked to answer questions on income using only ranges of income. The income variable thus varies from 1 to 7, 7 being the highest range. 16 We then estimate the following equation:
where income i,k ∈ [1 ; 7] . βs are estimated together with the cut points, κ 1 , κ 2 ,...,κ 6 .
We performed a Brant test to verify that proportional odds assumption is not violated, i.e. the 16 The ranges proposed are: fewer then a million Le, 1 to 5 million Le, 5 to 10 million Le, 10 to 15 million Le, 20 to 25 million Le, over 25 million Le. The exchange rate between Le and US$ varies around 1/3000. Note: * significant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%.
relationship between each pair of income groups is the same. The result suggests that the assumption is violated for the number of employees and the population of the chiefdom in 1985, but that the proportional regression assumption is not violated for the intensity of conflict variables. Moreover, the estimated coefficients are similar when we use an ordered logistic model where the proportional odds assumption is relaxed for the variables concerned. Therefore, in Table 4 only the first set of regressions are presented. The coefficients of the intensity of conflict are always negative suggesting that the more violent the conflict was, the lower the level of income of the firm ceteris paribus. The coefficients are only significant when the intensity is instrumented. The potential selection bias of the sample suggests that smaller firms have been destroyed and that among large firms only the most productive would have survived. It is likely that this phenomenon would have been accentuated in highly intense conflict zones. As a result the coefficient of the intensity of conflict variable should be upward biased, consequently the negative effect on the income of firms might have been even lower if smaller firms and unproductive large firms had survived.
On the one hand, the intensity of conflict did not affect either the existence of firms or their current (2006) employment level. On the other hand, however, it had a negative effect on both the size and the income of the firm. The findings imply that the conflict affected the availability and quality of capital.
Hence, it gives us a first sense confirming the theory developed earlier that conflict affects firms by destroying their human capital. The design of the SLES employers survey enables us to investigate this hypothesis more deeply through data on staff training. Specifically, we investigate whether the intensity of conflict affects the reported willingness of employers to pay for training of their staff.
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The underlying assumption is that the more employers feel a need to train their employees the more severe their shortage of qualified labour must be. We therefore estimate the following equation using a probit model:
where willingness is a dummy variable on whether the employer of the firm k operating in chiefdom i wants to invest more in the training of his employees. X i and X k are vectors of variables relative to the chiefdom i and to the firm k. Sector k is a discrete variable equal to one when the firm k operates in the sector considered and zero otherwise. Intensity i refers to the intensity of the war in chiefdom i.
The results are reported in Table 5 and 6. We are particularly interested in the sign and significance level of β 3 that captures the direct effect of the intensity of war, and β 5 the potential sectorial effect of the conflict.
We acknowledge that the willingness to pay for training variable might not be the ideal proxy for human capital and could in fact capture unobserved characteristics such as wealth effects, credit constraints or the costs of physical capital. However, we control for whether financing is one of the main constraints for growth and expansion and whether physical assets where acquired in the two years preceding the interview. Before introducing those as controls in the regression, we investigated whether there is a significant relationship between the financing constraint, capital investment, and the intensity of conflict. We observe a positive impact of the intensity of conflict on the probability that the firm faces major financing constraints (Table 9) . By contrast there is no significant relationship between the intensity of conflict in the zone and the proxy for capital investment. An explanation may be that physical capital levels might already have caught up in more destroyed areas as the data is collected five years after the peace agreement. In the light of those primary findings we introduced an interacted term between the intensity of conflict and the financial constraint dummy.
We find a positive and significant effect of the intensity variable. Although the coefficients are only significant without the inclusion of district effects, they are always positive. Thus, conflict appears to cause a scarcity of skills in those chiefdoms where the war was more intense, as indicated by the greater need to train. The reported marginal effects are strikingly high. This is consistent with our theory of 'forgetting by not doing': in areas where the conflict was more intense, employers show a significant higher need for human capital than in regions less affected by conflict, thus controlling for financial constraint and physical capital investment. The coefficient of the latter is positive but never 17 Employers were asked whether or not they would be willing to pay for the training of their employees.
significant which tends to confirm that human and physical capital are complementary rather than substitutes. Indeed, if they were substitutes we would expect firms who did not invest in physical capital to significantly compensate by training staff and as a result increasing human capital levels.
On the contrary, the results suggest that, if anything, investing in new assets leads to a higher need for skills. Financial constraints, on the other hand, seem to increase the need for training staff, which would imply that when employers are constrained to invest, they train their staff. Training may not been positive. Say a clothing manufacture might need to train its employees to work manually as it cannot pay for new machines. However, the coefficient of the interacted term is significant and negative, underlying that the effect of the financial constraint is lowered by the intensity of conflict.
We also investigate the willingness to pay for training of skilled staff as a robustness test. As discussed earlier, skilled labour elasticity to physical capital is lower than unskilled labour. The results presented in Table 11 and 12 display the same patterns, confirming the 'forgetting by not doing' effect, although the coefficients of the intensity of conflict variable show lower levels of significance.
In addition, we observe variations between sectors. Employers in the health and education sectors are significantly more willing to pay for training in conflict-affected areas. Possibly this is so, because these sectors are particularly skill-intensive, requiring workers such as pharmacists, medical staff, or teachers, whose training most likely occurs in Freetown. The same effect is distinguishable in the agrobusiness sector, although for different reasons. In the construction sector, the willingness to pay for training of the staff is higher, but we observe the opposite phenomenon in chiefdoms more affected by the war. Entrepreneurs are less likely to invest in training in those areas. One possible explanation is that as of 2006 reconstruction mainly occurred in Freetown, which was relatively less destroyed during the war than other parts of the country, but was nevertheless the core of post-conflict government attention. In more rural areas in the East, reconstruction had barely started by 2006.
The effect of the selection bias is unknown. If it is likely to bias the coefficient of the size of firms, it is only a control variable. However it is not clear how it impacts, if at all, the war intensity coefficients.
Conclusion
Using a firm survey, we investigated the economic legacy of the 1991-2002 war in Sierra Leone. The theory proposed is that conflict results in a significant loss in human capital stock as a result of a 'forgetting by not doing' phenomenon, broadly analogous to learning by doing. Civil war induces the reversion to more subsistence activities and less sophisticated techniques so that skills atrophy. During the post-conflict phase the growth of firms is therefore slower as human capital has become scarce and Notes: * significant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. We control for the number of employees and the income of the firm, for the log of the number of firms per chiefdom in 1970 and in 2006 and for the log of the population per chiefdom in 1985. The instrument is always significant in the first stage regressions. Coefficients are not reported for readability reasons. Notes: see notes Table 5 .
takes time to rebuild.
Our results support this hypothesis. Using geographical variations in the intensity of conflict, we find that the more firms were exposed to conflict the smaller they were as of 2006. However, such firms also tended to recover faster once peace was restored. The rate of recovery was approximately half the rate of decay during the war, corresponding to the macroeconomic effects of conflict and recovery estimated by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) .
The analysis of training patterns confirms the lack of skills experienced as a result of war. Entrepreneurs' willingness to pay for the training of their staff is significantly higher in those areas of the country most affected by the conflict, indicating a more acute shortage of skilled labour.
As a result of this observation, post-conflict governments should prioritize training in sectors that produce non-tradable goods, especially the capital non-tradable goods.
The 'forgetting by not doing' phenomenon has important implications for the recovery of a country.
Indeed, firms have to make do with lower quality workers. This impacts negatively their productivity and the acquisition of new techniques of production. As a result, the growth process is likely to be slowed down. In fact, post-conflict environments experience a 'supra-normal growth', underlying a catching up of the economy, potentially driven by the physical reconstruction. The rate of catching up is, however, diminished by the destruction of human capital, which takes long to recover, if ever, its counterfactual. Firms are also less competitive and exports will suffer accordingly. If the lack of skills in post-conflict economies is tackled early, it is likely that recovery would be much faster.
The lack of skills can also have much longer term consequences. Indeed, civil war not only deskills the existing labour force, but conflict also implies huge disturbances in schooling. The education system collapses often completely and children miss important years of schooling. As mentioned earlier, in Sierra Leone children were forcibly enrolled in the guerilla, some as young as age seven. Once peace is settled, there is a clear necessity to reconstruct the education system but no competences in the economy to achieve it. If not addressed, generations will continue to be lost. Formation and training appear as a necessity, but they are too few competent teachers or trainers. A solution is to encourage the diaspora to return and pass on the knowledge they acquired abroad during wartime.
7 Appendix Note: * significant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. Note: * significant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. Notes: * significant at 10%, ** at 5 %, *** at 1%. We control for the number of employees and the income of the firm, for the log of the number of firms per chiefdom in 1970 and in 2006 and for the log of the population per chiefdom in 1985. The instrument is always significant in the first stage regressions. Coefficients are not reported for readability reasons. Notes: see notes in Table 11 .
